4 Lessons Learned from the Rise and Fall of the Biggest Name in Glamping, Tentrr
Last week, we shared the story of a tremendous success in the glamping space. This week, we share lessons learned from a cautionary tale.
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Estimated time to read: 5 minutes
TL;DR:
What is Tentrr?
A now defunct company that sold glamping tent setups to and partnered with operators that grew to 1,000+ locations and 43 states before shutting its doors in late 2023.
Lessons learned:
Tentrr lacked quality control, brand consistency, and partnership standards and made poor business decisions based on unsustainable COVID-19 demand for glamping sites.
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Until the end of 2023, Tentrr was a glamping tent "quasi-franchisor" with 1,000+ locations in 43 states. By number of locations, they were the biggest name in glamping.
Aspiring operators and state parks, called “campkeepers,” would buy glamping tents from Tentrr, and then Tentrr would list the units for rent and collect payment on their booking platform.
In January 2024, I was working on a glamping market study and discovered Tentrr's website was down. A day passed, and the website had not come back online, so I started digging.
I found bankruptcy filing records and customers and employees posting on Reddit and LinkedIn about the firm's abrupt shutdown.
Tentrr was founded in 2015 by Michael D'Agostino in New York City, and the company raised $17.9MM across 6 venture funding rounds from 2015-2021.
In late 2021, Michael D’Agostino unexpectedly and tragically passed away. Anand Subramanian's LinkedIn lists him as the former CEO from August 2018 - December 2023.
Plenty of news has been published about the rise of Tentrr, but very little has been published about their fall. I found it interesting that according to Crunchbase, Tentrr conducted the following rounds of fundraising:
Seed rounds in 2015, 2016, and 2017
Series A in 2018
"Venture round" in 2020
Back to a seed round in late 2021
I'm no VC expert, but this path for fundraising may suggest a failure to reach critical mass. A Google search revealed Reddit posts by operator clients suggesting poor quality execution and failure to make payouts on bookings.
The Bankruptcy
As far as the bankruptcy goes, records show that the bankruptcy was initially filed under a Chapter 11 "reorganization" and was later converted to a Chapter 7 liquidation of assets. We can infer that Tentrr was unsuccessful in restructuring debt to stay solvent and had to liquidate.
The bankruptcy filing dated January 2, 2023, claimed the company "expanded quickly due to demand during [COVID]" and that "demand has not kept up with the ... rapid expansion, causing a cash flow problem." Cash flow problems were also attributed to an equipment lease with "unfair" terms.
While I am unaware of the terms of the equipment lease, the filing listed 2022 Equipment Leasing & Rental expenses at $1,867,268.76. Net Operating Income was -$5,244,879.01. Without that equipment lease expense, Tentrr would still have been nearly $3.4MM in the red in 2022. In other words, the equipment lease expense was far from the only reason Tentrr was hemorrhaging cash.
Reddit, LinkedIn, Facebook, and the BBB
I also found confirmation via a former employee's LinkedIn post that Tentrr was shut down and all employees abruptly laid off in December 2023.
Posts from confused campkeepers on Reddit revealed that they were left in the dark and unsure what to do with their Tentrr equipment. Campkeepers formed “former campkeeper” Facebook groups to support each other.
The cherry on top is the F rating on the Better Business Bureau website.
4 Lessons Learned
So, what does this mean for the overall glamping industry? Should glamping operators and investors be concerned?
The story of Tentrr provides GREAT context and insight into what it takes to be successful in the glamping industry. There are four glaring reasons why the Tentrr model failed.
Lesson #1: Lack of Quality Control
Plenty of anecdotal evidence on the internet reveals breakdowns with Tentrr's systems, processes, and, perhaps most importantly, the quality of tents and equipment. Glamping is a high-end leisure activity. You have to cater to that market. Tentrr failed.
Lesson #2: Lack of Brand Consistency
Tentrr was built on providing equipment and systems to aspiring glamping operators at its core, but Tentrr ultimately depended on unsophisticated operators to uphold the brand. This sounds incredibly difficult to do successfully. Customers who go to a Postcard Cabins or Under Canvas location know what to expect. Tentrr customers didn’t.
Lesson #3: Lack of Partnership Standards
It seems that Tentrr took on a lot of risk by essentially allowing anyone with some acreage to become a glamping operator using the Tentrr brand. Glamping is a high-end hospitality business. Not everyone is qualified to provide high-end hospitality.
Successful glamping operators are sophisticated hospitality pros who offer high-end amenities/services in great locations. Tentrr catered to "side hustlers" & didn't do enough to ensure any of the above. The future is bright for the operators who can offer these things. As with any hospitality offering, a successful operator's job is to provide an attractive mix of quality, service, location, and value/price.
Lesson #4: Poor Business Decisions Based on Unsustainable COVID-19 Demand
Tentrr took the buzz in the market around outdoor hospitality during COVID-19 as a signal to grow as much and as fast as possible, no matter what. Many outdoor hospitality operators are seeing numbers returning to pre-pandemic levels. The ones that took on growth-related risk during the pandemic are hurting now.
That’s all for this week. Thank you so much for reading!
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